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T 1 iE S I S
The Power of' a State to
Interfere with Inter-State Commerce.
-by-
George J. O'Connor,
Cornell University School of Law,
1893.

PREFACE.
In the category of perplexing legal -roblems
arising out of the complexity of our dual system of govern-
ment, there are, perhaps, none more difficult of solution
then tbose involving the interpretation and construction of
that clause of the Constitution which grants to Congress the
power to regulate commerce.
Upon an examination of the immense mass of cases
dealing with this subject, it at once becomeE apparent that
thte has not been, nor is there t the present day, a uni-
formity of opinion among the judges of the Supreme Court as
to the preeise limit of this power.' Every important case
has been a battle ground and almost every decision has met
with a strong and vigorous dissent.
In vriting this t-eatise I have attempted to
set forth briefly the law as I have found It, without attemp
ting to advanee any independent theory by which all the de-
cisions ca- be reconciled. I have cited a number of cases
but no more than I have th.ught necessary to illustrate fully
the workings of the principles and propositions stated.
It has bee- happily said that the Constitution of
the United States is an instrument of enumeration rather than
one of definition, therefore to discover the approximate
limits of a grant such as the one empowering Congress to
regulate commerce, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States must necessarily be the sources of investi-
gation. Consequently a treatise on this subject can, at
best, be little more than a digcst and discussion of the
cases.
EY object in vwriting this was not an ambitious de-
sire to be ranked among the writers, on this subject, who
with their graceful pens, have written, on the pages of time,
an immortal name for themselves; but rather a desire tb fur-
nish a reference to the leading rrinciples and propositions
which may be deduced from the chaos of' decisions and irrecor*
cilable dicta involving the construction of Article I. Sec. 8,
of the Constitution. If the reader finds that this work ac-
complishes that object, I gratefully receive any criticism
which may be passed upon it.
Among the powers confcerred u-on the central govern-
munt by the several states and enumerated in the Constitution
of the United States, one of the most important, one of the
most necessary and vital to the prosperity and life of the
Union is the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce
and is found in Article I. Sec. 8, couched in the following
language "The Congress shall have power. . .. to regulate
commerce with foreign nations among the several states and
with Indian tribes."
In order to obtain a proper understanding of the
nature and scope of the clause, it will be necessary to
glance at the history of the several states immediately prior
to the adoption of the Constitution, that we may see the ob-
ject sought to be accomplished and the difficulty sought to
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be overcome by conferring this impotteat power upon Congress.
Under the old Confederation, the Congress had no power to reg-
ulate commerce or to impose or levy duties or customs on for-
eign or imported goods. It is true that Congress had the
power to make treaties and the compact between the states
declared that no stste should lay any imposts or duties which
might interfere with any stipulation in treaties entered into
by the Congress ut this power to make treaties was rendered
2
useless by the fact that the Federal government had no means
to enforce their observance and as might be expected their
stipulations were recklessly disregarded by the states.
Each state consequently, could and did establish a separate
tariff and pursued its own commeruial policy. This want of
uniformity could be productive of nothing but commercial
dimunition. States which from their geographical position
enjoyed great natural commercial facilities took undue ad-
vantage of them and the other states resorted to retaliation.
The state of commerce before the adoption of the Constitution
can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign
nations with a single view to their own interests and the dis-
united efforts of the legislatures of the several states
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to counteract their restrictions, were rendered powerless by
a want of combination. One of the most important industries
of an ambitious, strong, energetic people who in interest,
language and religion were really one was ralidly declining.
The strong sympathies which bound the states together dur-
ing a common war disappeared when peace was, declared and petty
jealousies croppd out in the form of laws containing embarass-
ing restrictions, and destroyed that friendly entorcourse(1)
between the states 'do necessary for a rerfect union.
That some reform was necessary was becoming pain-
fully apparent to the states. As earily as 1778 the subjectj
was brought to the attention of Congress by a memorial from
the state of New Jersey and in i781 a resolution was presented
to that body by Dr. Witherspoon, affirming that it was indtspen-
sably necessary that the United States in Congress assembled
with J /
should be vested - a right of supertending the commercial
regulations of every state. The resolution of Virginia ap-
pointing commissioners to meet commissioners from other states
expresses the purpose to be to look int.o the necessity of an
uniform system of commercial regulation; and Mr. Madisons
resolution for the same purpose is introduced by a preamble
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from which the following is a quotation, ",VWhereas the rela-
tive situation of the United States has been found,on trial,
to require uniformity in their cormnorciai regulations, as the
only effectual poliuy for obtaining in the ports of a foreign
nations a stipulation of privileges reciprocal. to those en-
joyed by the subjects of such nations in the yrts of the
United States; for rreventing animosities which can not fail
to arise among the se!cral states from the interference
of partial and separate regulations ..... Therefore be it
resolved etc.,etc."
In conformity with the resolution adopted by Congress
in Feb. 1887, delegates from all the states with the exception
of Rhode Island, met in Philadelpia on the first Monday in
May, 1787, and the result of the Convention was the present
Constitution of the Unitec States, containing the commercial
clause, as above set out, with the exception of the words
"and with the Indian tribes" which was added later; and to th
this general grant were added the following special prohit-
itions. "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state. No preference shall be given by any regu-
lation of Congress or rovenue to the ports of one state
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over those of another; no shall vessels sound to or from one
state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."
No state shall without the consent of Congress lay any imposts
or duties on imports or exports, excelt what may be absolutely
necessary for the execution of its inspection laws. No state
shall without the consent of Congress law any duty on tonnage."
The framers of the Constitution started out not
merely to make an instrument of government, but to construct
a nation. And in the Constitution they incorporated among
the enumerated grants to the central govermn-ent the rpower to
enforce and carry out the provisions of those grants. It is
not necessary for Eme to state the result of Veir efforts and
national
thewonderful and unprecedented~growth which followed the
adoption of the Co-° stitution is, to a large degree, owing to
the clause which conferred on Congress the power to regulate
Congress with foreign nations and among the several states.
Immediately upon the adoption of the Constitution, by the
people, those legislative embodiments of state jealousies,
the intquitous and impolitic laws droped lifeless from the
statute books of the different states, and the restrictive
inter-state commerce gave away to an vunfettered freedom of
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intercourse.
I have thus briefly s~ateled the outline of the e4a
state of the commercial industry immediately prior to the
adoption of the Constitution, that we may the more clearly
see the purposes and aims od the states in conferring upon
Congress this important power and having these purposes and
more
aims in mind we maythe . fully understand the nature and-
scope of the clause granting it and may be in a better po-
sition to examine a few of the leading cases involving ,its
construction and interpretation. The first question which
confronts us is whether this power to regulate commerce is
exclusive in Congress.
The famous case of Gibbon vs. Ogden, reported in
9 Wheaton, 1, was the first case in which the language of
this grant received a judicial construction. In this case
a law of the state of New York granting certain persons the
exclusive privilege to navigate all navigable waters of the
state, in vessels propelled by steam was declared invalid
in so far as it applied to a steam vessel enrolled as a coast-
er under the laws of the United States. All that was actual-
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ly decided by this case was that laws passed by Congress,
in exercise of its commercial power, were paramount to con-
flicting state legislation. In discussiong the manner in
which the clause conferring the grant of rowers of Congress
should be construed the courts speaking through Chief Justice
Marshall use the following language:- "We know of no rule
for construing the extent of such powers, other than as
given by the language of the instrument which confers them,
taken in connexion with the purposes for which they were
conferred,, and then proceeded to examine the meaning of the
word commerce. Commerce, he says, is intercourse; that it
describes the commercial intercouse between nations and parts
of a nation; that the word as used in the Constitution com-
prehends navigation; that the commerce wnich Congress has -
power is a unit comprehending every species of commercial
intercourse and that the Tower to regulate commerce is the
power to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be govern-
ed. Johnson J. supplements this in a separate opinion by
stating that the subject, the vehical, the agent and the
various operations become the subject of commercial regu-
lation; that shir building, the carrying trade, the propaga-
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tion of seamen are such vital agents of commercial prosperity
that a nation that could not legislate over such subjects
would not possess the powers to regulate commerce. Pro-
ceding the Chief Justice said that the word 'among' meant
intermingling with, that is it did not stop at state lines,
but that it did not comprehend completely internal commerce of
a single state. He then proceeded and decided the case upon
the facts resting '-is decision upon the fact that the law in
question passed by the legislature of the State of New York,
was in direct conflict with the laws passed by Congress in
the exercise of the power to regulate commerce, This case
has always been considered the fountain head og the law on -f-
this subject and as one of the chief bulwarks of the Consti-
tution. Chief Justice Marshall in rendering the opinion
did not confine himself to stating principles applicable to
the case but enunciated broad principles which underlie and
support the whole Constitution r guage in this case
is considered at almost a part of the Constitution itself.
The next case involving the interpretation of the
clause was Brown vs. The State of Md., reported in 12 Vneaton
419, where the construction of the clause as laid down in
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Gibbon vs. Ogden, was teiterated and a statute of Maryland
requiring an importer of foreign dry-goods and other articles
to take out a license from the state before he could be per-
mitted to sell the bales or packages so imported, w-.s held
void because in confl[ict with the Sth and 10th clauses-of
Article I. of the Constitution. The courts said:- 'There is
no difference between a rower to prohibit the sale of an ar-
ticle and thepowerto prohibit its introduction into the
country. The statute in question was an act supplementary
to an act of Congress regulating the retailing of imported
dry-goods, and therefore does not decide that the mere grants
of Congress of the 1.ower to regulate inter-state commerce
without Ilegislation in pursuance thereof prevented the
states from exercisi ,g such a power. But the grant con-
tained in the Constitution together wit'- the legislation of
Congress in pursuance thereof, percluded the states from
interferring with the subject matter of the Congressional
legislation and from passing any suprplementary or additional
measures even though there was no direct conflict between
such measures and the measures enacted by Congress. Al-
though it was decided in neither of these cases that the
-10
that
power was exclusive in Congress andAeven although Congress
had not exercised the Tower the states had no right to act.
Yet the remarks of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbon vs. Ogden,
in answering,the arguement that as the states have rower to
pass laws regulating its internal affairs such as health
laws etc., which affect Congress they tkvzj therefore have
concurrent power with Congress to regulate Commerce, seems
necessarily to lead to the conclusion that the rower in Con-
gress is exclusive; and that it the states pass valid
laws interfering with Congress they do so in the exercise of
another and distinct rower which were reserved by the states
and never ceded to Congress and one under which Congress has
no right to act.
The statutes declare constitutional in Wilson vs.
Black Creek Marsh Co.; New York vs Miln, were statutes passed
in the exercise of this power reserved by the states and
thereforelthese cases which we will notice in another con-
nection, did not decide that the power to regulate conmerce
was either exclusive or concurrent.
The opinions in the License Cases and Passenger
Cases which came next in order of time, present in the stron-
gest
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gest light the diversity of judicial opinion at that time
(1847-49)7upon the question as to whether the states had a
right to legislate in reference to commerce when Congress
failed to do so. This question was at the basis of the
great, burning, political question of state a-.d national
rights and the judges seized upon these cases as an oppor-
tunity of Tetting forth their partisan, individual, opinions.
The License Cases involve the validity of state liquor
license laws which it was claimed were unconstitutional, in
so far as they operated to impose a burden upon the sale of
liquors brought into the state from without. All the judges,
in their opinions, sustained the validity of the laws but
their decisions were base5 upon various reasonings, three of
the judges based their decision upon the fact that the law in
question were not a regulation of Congress. Chief Justice
Tanney took the position that the laws were rgulations of
inter-state commerce but that the power to regulate conrmmerce
was concurrent and therefore that the laws were valid. In
the Passenger Cases the Constitutionality of state laws
imposing a tax upon every non-resident landing within the
from
state,fox every vessel arriving from a port of any foreign
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state or country was in question and decided by a divided
court, five judges against four to be invalid, because in
conflict with laws of Congress. in this case as in the
License Case each of the judges renderod exhaustive opinions
presenting their respective views upon the question of the
concurrency or exclusiveness of the power to regulate commerce
But neither this caseor as we have seen, any prior case,
called for a decision of this question.
However, in 1851, the question came up directly
before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Cooley vs. Board of Port Wardens, The law there in question
was a statute of Penn. which established and -'rovided for the
regulation of pilots for the port of Philadelphia and
prescribed certain duties in respect to such pilots to the
master of vessels arriving at that port. Curtis J. in
rendering the opinion of the court, uses the following lan-
guage, which settled the controversy between the concurrent
and exclusive theories, and lays down for the first time as
law the rule which has since been recognized and universally
followed, and is at the present day looked u-on as a sound
principle of constitutional law. !'Eithe-' absolutely af-
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firm or deny that the nature of this nower requires exclusive
legislation by Congress is to lo se sight of the nature of
the subjects of this power and to assert concerning all of
them, what is realy 3pplicable, but to a part. Whatever
subjects of this power are, in their nature national, or
admit of only one uniform system or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress.", And then proceeded to
state and decide the case upon the ground, that such subjects
of commerce as admitted og local regulation might be control-
led by state legislation.
That this is the -nly true solution and interpre-
tation of the commercial clause of the constitution, and that
any other construction would practically defeat the ends for
which it was given,,is obvious,; that the rule stated in
Cooley vs. The Board of Wardens is a chrystalization of the
theory held by Chief Justice Marshall appears from his Ian-
guage ' in. Gibbon vs. Ogden; and that the judges who
so vigorously conteded in the License Cases and Passenger
Cases that the state had the rower to legislate upon subjects
in their nature national, read the clauze through partisan
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spectacles, is easily discerned upon a roading of the opin-
ions there rendered.
From these cases involving the interpretation and
construction of Article I. sec. 8 of the Constitution we may
draw the following conclusions:-
1st., That navigation is commerce within the meaning of
the commercial clause of the Constitution.
2nd., That articles brought from one state into another
remain articles of commerce while in the origi~al package and
privilege of
a law imposing a license tax upon the selling the same is
a regulation of commerce.
3rd., Whien the subject upon which Congress can ac by
virtue of its commercial -ower is national in its character
and admits of, and requires uniformity of regulation effect-
ing alike all the states, Congress alone can act upon it and
provide the needed regulations; and the absence of any law
of Congress upon the subject is equivalentto its declaration
that commerce in that matter should be free.
4th., VWhen the subject is local in its nature or sphere
of le-ration) such as pilot laws which can be properly regu-
lated only by special provisions adopted to their location,
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the state can act until Congress interferes and supercedeS
the state authority.
Thus the law stands to-cnay and how well those faith-
ful guardians of the Constitution , the judges of the Supreme
Court, have looked into th-Ie rurposes and aims of the states
in conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the states- and how well they
have, in their holding, conformed with the intention of the
framers of the Constitution in interpretating and construing
the clause granting it may be seen by comparing the 3rd and
4th conclusions above stated with the woris of Hamilton in
No. 32 of the Federalist. "This exclusive delegationor
rather the alienation of state sovereignty) wolild only ex-
ist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms
if
granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where grante
in one instance, an authority to the Union and in another prq-
hibited the states f-o_-. exercising the like authority; and
when it granted an authority to the Union to which a similar
authority in the state would be absolutely and totally con-
tradictory and repugnant."
Having thus ascertained the construction put upon
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this clause by the courts and the principles which determine
the respective powers of Congress and of the states it will
be seen that the test to be applied to determine the validity
of state legislation, on this subject, in every case are the
following; --
lst., Does Congress have exclusive power o'er the subject
matter?
2nd., If Congress has the exclusive power over the sub-
ject matter, is the law in question a regulation of Commerce-
-that is, does it proscribe the rules by which commerce is to
be carried on?
3rd., If Congress does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter does the law conflict with any act of
Congress?
And it s ,all now be my rurpose to examine some of
the leading cases in which these tests have been applied and
from them determine, if possible, the limits of constitu-
tional state legislation which effects foreign and inter-state
commerce. As will appear, the line between the subjects
of legislation national in their character and those local in
their nature; and between laws which constitute a regulation
-16-
Of co0rC,1*c and those which do not, is very indistinct.
The courts have traced the line from point to point, as each
case arose, have been very careful to go no further than the
down
facts of the case compelled them to go and have laid no prin--
ciple or rule which will serve us as a touch stole, by which,
we can in every case tell on which side of the line a certain
law lays.)
The Mnth Amendment of the Constitution is as fol-
lows:-- "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are
reserved to the states respectively or to the people.' The
extent of those powers retained by the state, is well defined
by Madison in the 45th No. of the Federalist, in the folowing
language:- "The powers reserved to the several states will
extend to all objects, which in the ordinary couse of affairs
concern the lives, liberties and property of the people; and
the internal order, improvement and property of the state.,
And laws passed by the states in the exercise of these powers
may be valid even altkough they to some extent affect com-
merce. In the case of Sherlock vs. Alling, 93 U.S., 103,
the court says:-- "Legislation, in a great variety of ways,
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may effect commerce and persons engaged in it without consti-
tuting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. ",
Among the powers reserved to the states is that pow-
er so necessary for the protect ion and comfort of the citizens
of every civilized state, the rolice power. And it here be-
cores necessary to observe w at is the meaning of the
phrase 'police power,' It is difficult,if not impossible,
to defines the limits of this power with any reasonable degree
of certainty . The courts have been -.. _,-,1inclined to
discribe rather than define it. To minds like that of
Chief Justice Tanney, the term police power is tantamount to
the term sovereign power. Here, however, for convenience,
we will teeat the police power as distinct from the taxing
power of the state.as here used it may be aaid, in a general
way, to incluide the means to legislate for the furtherance of
domestic order, morals, health, comfort and safety of the peo-
ple; for the exclusion of paupers, idiots and lunatics and
for the general welfare of the state.
In the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall., 36, it was
held that the power extends to the suppression of nuisances,
-18-
when they prove injurious to the pIblic health and in deciding
the catse, Miller J. days:-- "The power is and must be from
its very nature, incapable of any exact definition or limit-
ation . Upon it depends the security of social order, the
life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an. existence
in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and
social life and the beneficial use of property." And in
Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R.R.Co., 27 Vt., 149, Chief
Justice Redfield. uses the fdLowing often quotedi language in
speaking of the police power of the state. "It extends to
the protection of tlie lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet
of all persons, and the protection of all property within the
state." And in R.R.Co. vs. Hazen, 95 U.S., 142, the court s
says:- "It may also b e admittcd that the police power of the
state justifies the adoption of precautionaty means against
social evils.
In Wilson vs. The Black Creek Marsh Co., 2 Peters,
245, a statute of Deleware, permitting a company to dam a
small1 nagigable, tidal creek for the purpose of reclaiming
marsh lands and improving the drainage of the surrounding
territory, was held valid, and not in conflict with any con-
-10-
stitutional provisions. The opinion in this case, was
written by C'ief Justice Marshall, and has been thought, by
some judges, to be in coIflict with the 7ri-ciples laid down
by him in Gibbon vs. Ogden; but that he considered the law Of
the state a valid exercise of the police power is seen from t
the following language in his opinion theret endered:--"The
value of the property on its banks iust be enhanced by exclud-
ing the water from the marsh and the health of the inhab-
itapts probably improved" and in striet conformity with his
statement in Gibbon vs. Ogden in speaking of the powers of
the state:- "They form a portion of that immense mass of
legislation not stkrendered to the general g erpnent, all
which can be nnodt advantageously administered by the states
themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws
of every discription. . . . . are component parts. ,'
In city of New York vs. Miln, 11 Peters, 102, a
statute of New York which required of a master of every ves-
sel arriving from a foreign port, in that of New York City,
to report the name of all his passengers, with particulars as
to their age, occupatioK, last place of settlement, and place
was in question.
of their birth,, Although this statute operated, at least,
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indirectly ulon the commercial intercouse of the citizens of
the United States and of foreign nations, it was held to be
the state thd valid.
a law passed in the exercise of th police :.o' :cr aif In Cooley
vs. Board of Port 'Vardens,above referred to, the court held
that pilot laws were local in their nature and that therefore
until Congress had acted the state had pow'r to pass them.
In Gilman vs. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 713, a law authorizing
the bridging of the navigable stream and in Tounty of Mobile
vs. Kimball, 102 U.S., 69, laws providing for harbor improve-
ments were held valid on the smme prii ciple.
In the case of Pond vs. Turch, 95 U.S., 459, it
was held that in the absence of legislation of Congress
bearing on the subject, a statute of Wis. which authorized the
erection of a dam across a navigable strean. ,-:hici A into the
Mississirpi river, and which was Wholly within the limits of -
the state was -ot unconstitutional; and in Escambia Ce. vs.
Chicago, 107 U.S,, 678, the court held that the Chicago
river although lying within the li-.its of the state of Ill.,
is a -art of the navi-able waters of the United States over
which Congress, in the exercise of its rower under the com-
mercial clause of the Constitution, may exercise control to
-21-
extent necessary to protect its free navigation; but until
that body acts the state has plenary power over bridges cross-
ing it.
In Packet Co. vs. Cattelsburg, 105 U.S., 559, a
state law authorizing a town, situated upon navigable waters
to erect wharv~cs, , collect reasonable wharfage and forbid
vessels, under penalty, to land within the corporate limits
at any point other than the public wharf or landing was de-
clard valid. in speaking of the state law the court say:-
"It belongs manifestly to that class of legislation ,ve f1c
I R. o + n 8 - which like -ilotage and some others
can be most wisely exercised by local authorities, and in re-
gard to which no general rules, applicable alike to all ports
and landing places, can be properly made,
Morgan Steamship Co. vs. Board of Health, 118 U.S.,
455, involvedthe validity and constitutionality of a state
statute~requiting that each vessel passing a certain quaran-
tine station shall pay a fee fixed by the statute, for exam-
ination as to their sanitary condition. Miller J. in render-
ing the opinion of the court said:-- "Quarantine laws be-
long to that class of state legislation, which, whether passed
-23-
with intent to regulate commerce or not must admitted to
have that effect and which are valid until displaced or con-
trovened by some legislation of Congre3s. "
The above are a few, of the many, cases in which it
has been held that the state had rower to enac5 in the exer-
cise of the police power, wharfage laws etc., which were vir-
tually regulations of bomarerce and are all explained by the
rule lai. down in Cooley vs. Board of Wardens, that where the
subject of the state law is local in its nature and is not in
conflict with any legislation of Congress,it is not in contro-
vention of the 8th Bebton of Artcle I. of the Constitution.
On the other hand in Welton vs. Mo., 01 U.S., 275, a statute
of Mo. requiring the rayment of a license tax from persons
selling Zoods not the growth or manufacture of the state, and
not from persons so selling goods which :Jere the growth of
ib1nufacture of the state, was held unconstitutional and void
by reason of the discrimination bptween citizens of their own
state and those of another. And in machine Co. vs. Gage,
100 U.S., a statute iiiposing a like tax but without discrim-
ination as to the place of gruwth or manufacture, was ad-
judged to be constitutional.
-24-
In Railroad Co. vs. Ilusen, 95 U.S., 465, A statute
of Missouri forbidinZ the introduction of any Texas, Mexican
or Indian cattle into the state during certain months of
the year, was held to an unconstitutional interference with
inter-state commei'ce, upon the groud that the statute made
no distinction in the transportation forbiden between catt1e
which might be dtseased and those which were not. The court
in this case said that the state may not under the cover of
exerting its police -ower, substantially prohibit all burden
inter-state commerce; and that the reason of the statute
was far beyond its professed object and far- L to the -
realm of the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.
In Bowman vs. The Railroad Co., 125 U.S., 405, a
statute of Iowa which forbade common carriers to bring in-
toxicating liquors into the sta.te from any other state with-
out first obtaining the certificate from a county officer of
Iowa )to the effect that the consignee was authorized by the
laws of Mowa to sell such liquors, was held to be an unconsti-
tutional regulation of commerce. In Railroad Co. vs. Ill.,
118 U.S., 557, the court decided that a state had no power to
regulate the rate of freight of any -art of continuous trans-
portation upon railroads rartly within the state and partly
-25-
without the state. in Honderson vs. The Mayor, 92 U.S., 259,
a statute imposing a burdei'some condition, on ship masters as
prerequisite of the landing of -assengers, was held to be a
regulation of commerce and void. And a statute,,levying a
tax upon non-resident drummers of68ring for sale or selling
goods, wares or merchindise by sample manufactured or be-
longing to citizens ofother states)vas held to be a regulation
of commerce and void in the case of Robbins vs. The Shelby
Taxing District, 120 U.S., 489. It was held in Brown vs.
Maryland, as we have already seen, that a state cannot con-
stitutionally require the importer of foreign articles to
take out a license from the state before he shall be permitted
to sell the bales or packages so imported.
The following )iave also been held to be regulations
;of commerce and void; A law requiring an inspection on the
hoof of all animals brought within the state to be used as
food (Minn. vs. Barber, 136 U.S., 313.); a statute of a state
forbidding the sale of liquor in the original package by a
person who brought it within the state from another state. on
the ground that liquor was an article of commerce (Leisy vs.
Harding, 135 U.S., 100).
-26-
From the above cases, it will be observed, that
when the subject of legislation is local in its nature a
state may)in the exercise of its police powerenact laws even
though they amount to a regulation of co-merce. But that
that portion of either inter-state or foreign commerce which
consists of either transic or traffic, including transporta-
tion in all forms, by land or by water, and the purchase,
sale or exchange of goods is national in its character, sus-
septible of a uniform plan of regulation and is therefore
under the exclusive control of Congress. And the law of a
state enacted in the exercise of its police -,ower if it is
not discrimination in its effect and was not enacted for
the -urpose of burdening or restricting inter-state commerce,
maypindirectlyeffect this commerce and yet be valid; but if
it was enacted, ostensibly, in the exercise of the police
power but the court can see that the police power is used as
a veil or guise to hide some selfish motive of the state for
which it was passed )or if it amount to a regulation of Con-
gres~, it will be declared void.
There yet remains for us to discuss the taxing power
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of the state and to notice how far this power is limitcd by
the commercial clause of the Constitution.
Inherent in every independent state, as an inse;-
arable inctlent of sovereignty, is the Tower to levy taxes.
This power which is a sacred one and one of vital importance,
is justified by the principles of necessity and self preser-
vation. A tax is a demand of sovereignty ---- the amount
a member of
which the government requires 7 community to contribute
toward the support and maintainance of the institutions which
insure to him the protection of life, liberty and property;
the protection of his civil rights and the redress of his
wrongs.
Under our form of government) the power to levy
taxes is a concurrent and a co-equal one in the United States
and in the individual states. It was absolute in the
several states, before the adoption of the Constitution of the
United Statesand in that instrument there is no expressio3
in any granting clausewhich marks that power exclusive in
the Union; nor is there any independent clause, or sentence,
which :.rohibits the states from exercising it. Therefore,
the power to levy taxes may be said to be an absolute power in4
the states, ackniowledging no other limits than those express-
ly,; prescribed in the Constitution. -- (,vaColloh vs. Maryland,
4 Wheaton, 415. )
It is, at the present day, a well settled doctrine
that a state may levy taxes on all the property, real or
personal, having a situs within its boundaries; and in the
application of this rule, property employed in carrying~com-
merce between the states or with foreign nations is not ex-
cepted. (Glouchester Ferry Co. vs. Penn., 114 U.S., 196, at
Jage 206.) The question now arise- how far can the state go9
in taxing the instruments of inter-state co-mercej without
coming in conflict with the co~mmrcial powers of the Oonsti-
tution? It is evident that a state cannot, under the guise
ofjits taxing power,regulate commerce among the states or
with foreign nations. But, it will readily be observed that,
from the very nature of things, the line of demarcation be-
tween a valid exercise of the taxing powers of a state and
the invalid attempt to rdgulate commerce bemust be very dim
and indistinct; and is to be ascertained in every close case
with difficulty.
To aid us in fixing the approximate location of the
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boundaries of this power of a state it will be well to ex-
amine a fewrl cisions , without attempting an exhaustive
citation of -ll the authorities, involving the validity of
state taxation laws, and from them to determine, ;f Pos-
sible the : rinciples which guide the courts in determining
the validity or invalidity of state legislation.
The case of Brown vs. Maryland, which we have no-
ticed in another connection, is one of the leading cases on
this subject. The state of Maryland had passed an act im-
posing a license fee npon importers of certain zinds of mer-
chandise. The court held that this law imposed a burden
the business of
upon engaging ininter-state or foreign comerce; that a tax
upon the importer, because of his business, is a tax upon the
business itself and therfore an encroachment upon the power of
Congress and void. The case of Cook vs. Pe.n., 97 U.S., 556,
involved the validity of a state law exacting a certain per-
centage of the proceeds of foreign goods sold at auction for
the privilgge of selling them in that manner. The tax was
held to be a duty on imports and the law imposing it uncon-
stitutional.
In Crandall vs. The State of Nevada, 6 Wall., 35,
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A law which imposed a capitation tax of one dollarupon car-
riers for every 'person leaving the state, by any vehicle en-
gaged or employed in the business of transporting passengers
for hire was held to be in effect a tax upon the rassengors
for the privilege of being carried out of the state~and for
that reason a regulation of commerce and void. In The State
Freight Tax Case, 15 7all., 232, the constitutionality of a
statute of a state imposing a tax upon freights taken up
within the state and carriocT out of it or taken up without
the state and brought within it was involved, The court de-
cided that this statute imposed a burden on inter-state com-
merce and was therofore void. And in Fargo vs. 1M1ich., 121
U.S., 230, a statute of 7.iich. levying a tax upon the gross
receipts of railroads employed in the carriage of freights
and passengers into, oilt of or through the state, was held
to be a tax upon commerce among the states, void and uncon-
stitutional. It will be seen from the last two cases that
a state can enforce no regulation which make foreign or inter-
state commerce subject to the payment of tribute to them.
Another important case which we have noticed briefly in an-
other connection, is the case of Robbins vs. The Shelby Taxing
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District, lO U.S., 489. A statute of Tenn., enacted that
all drummers and all persons not having a regular licensed
house of business in the taxing district, offering for sale
or selling goods, wares or merchandise, therein by sample
shall be required to pay to the county treasurer a certain
amount, each week as a privilege tax. Robbins, a drummer for
a Cincnati firm was rrosecuted for a violation of this law.
The courts said that although this statute purported to tax
the business of selling goods by sarlce...and applied to per-
sons who resided within the state as well as to those who
might come from other states to engage in that business,
and was therefore not Idiscriminating in its effect yet the
business of selling goods by sample which were in another
state,at the time and were to be delivered within the dis-
trict constituted an inter-state commercial business; and
that so far as this tax was to be imposed upon Robbins for
doing that business, it was a tax upon inter-state commerce
and therefore void.
A le.ing case, following Fargo vs. Mich., and
laying down the important doctrine that a state law imposing
a tax upon the gross recei-ts, of a corporation derived from
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the transportation of persons and property between different
states and from foreign countries, imposes a regulation of
inter-state and foreign commerce and is void and unconsti-
tutional, is Philadelphia Steamship Co. vs. Penn., 122 U.S.,
326.
It is a well settled doctrine of constitutional
law that the powers conferred upon Congress in the Consti-
tution are not of determined extent but expand with the ad-
vance of invention and civilization; that the powet in Congrem
to regulate commerce extends not only to the means and instru-
mantalities of commerce known and in use at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, but to all such means and in-
strumentalities since discovered or invented. An excellent
illustration of this is the line of cases in which state
statutes impoeing restrictions upon, or regulating the use of,
the telegraph were declared void. The case of Telegraph Co.
vs. Texas, 105 U.S., 46, following Pensacoila Telegraph Co.
vs. The western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S., 1, held that a
statute of Texas, imposing a tax upon any message transmitted
by a telegraph Co, so far as it operated upon messages sent
out of the state, was a regulation of foreign and inter-state
commerce and beyond the power of the state to enact. In
rendering the opinion the court uses the failowing language
"A Telegraph Co. occup#ies the same relation to commerce as
a carrier of goods, both companies are instruments of commerce
and their business is commerce itself."
On the other hand, as I have before remarked, it is
a well settled principle that a state can, in the exercise of2
its taxing powers, constitutionally lexy taxes upon all
property within the state, even though such property be en-
gaged in carrying on foreign or inter-state conimerce. In
Pullman Palace Car Co- vs. Penn., 141 U.S., 18, the con-
stitutionallity of a statute of Penn., was in question.
The statute imposed a tax on the capital stock of- all corpor-
ations engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers
within the state, under Vhich a corporation of another state
engaged in running railroad cars, into, through and out of
the state and having at all times a large number of such cars
within the state, was taxed by ts-ing as a basis of assessment
such pvportation of its capital stock as the number of miles
of railroad over which its cars are run within the state_
bears to the whole number of miles both within the state and
-, A1
without/over which its cars are run. The corporation con-
tended that the tax was a regulation of inter-state commerce;
but the court held that for the rurpose of taxation, personal
property may be separated from its ov~er and that the statute
in question was in effect a tax upon property having its situs
within the state and therefore valid. In Western Union
Telegrarh Co. vs. Mass., 125 U.S., 550, a statute of Mass.,
imposing -.n excise tax upon the capital of a foreign corpor-
ation engaged in inter-state commerce, the value of which was
to be ascertained by comparing the length of its lines in that
state, with the length of its entire linos was held to be a
tax upon property within the state and that the manner of as-
certaining the amount of the tax did not invalidate the sta-
tute imposing it. Again in M1ass. vs. The Western Union
Telegraph Co., 141 U.S., 40, a foreign corporation questioned
the validity of a state law which imposed upon evdry tele-
graph company o~ing a line within the state a tax upon its
corporate franchise, at a valuation thereof equal to the ag-
gregate umber of shares in its c-pital stock, deducting such
portion of that valuation as is proportional to the length of
its lines without the state. The court held that the tax was
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in effect, a tax upon the corpor:ation on account of property
owned and used by it'within the state and therefore valid.
In Glouchester Ferry Co. vs. Penn., 114 U.S., 196, it was held
that the state could not tax the c-pital stock of a ferry com-
pany of another state whose only business within the former
state is discharging and receiving 1rersons and property pas-
sing between the states. In rendering the opinion in this
case the court uses the following language:- "While it is
conceeded that the property in a state belonging to a foreign
corporation engaged in foreign or inter-atate commerce~may
be taxed equally with like property of a domestic corpor-
ation engaged in that business, we are clear that a tax or
other burden imposed on the property of either corporation,
because it is used to carry on that commerce, or upon the
transportation of persons or Iroperty or for the navigation
of the publie waters over which the transportation is made,
is invalid and void as an interference with,and an obstruc-
tion of, the power of Congress in the regulation of ouch
commerce.
In Norfolk 3: Western R.R.Co. vs. Penn., 130 U.S.,
114, A statute of the state of Penn. imposing a tax upon a
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foreign corporation engaged in inter-state mo mcrce, for the
privilege of keeping an office in the state for the use of its
officers, stockholders, agents and employees, was hold to be
unconstitutional and void. And in McCall vs. Cal., 136
U.S., 104, the state of California haK levtod a tax upon a
foreign railroad corporation for the privilege of keeping an
agency within the state for the purpose of inducing passen-
gers going from SarFrancisco to New York city, to take t'S
line at Chicago. The court held that the agency in question
was a means of inter-state commerce and that the tax imposed
upon the agent for doing business in San~rancisco was a tax
#pon such means and therefore void. Both of these cases
were decided upon the theory that the subject matter of the
tax was one of the means and instrumentalities of carrying
on inter-state; and the tax in both cases~was in terms upon
the privilege of exercising those means and therefore void.
While the language in the former of these cases, t ken alone,
might lead one to think that the point decided was that a-s-A
state cannot levy a tax upon a foreign corporation engaged
in inter-state commerccfor the privilege of exercising a
corporate franchise within the state, yet this case refers
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back and rests its decision uron the case of McCall vs. Cal.,-
decided, at the same term, and upon a close reading will be
seen, I think, to have been decided upon the facts above in-
dicated i.e., that the office in question waa a necessary in-
strument of inter-state commerce and thcrefore could no more
be made the subject ma~ter of a -rivilege tax than could
the cars, depots, road-beds and other necessary means of
carrying on inter-state or foreimn commerce.
Those cases natur lly lead up to a discussion
of the interesting and irnportnat question whether a state can
levy a tax upon a foreign corporation engaged in the business
of inter-state or foreign comnerce, for the purpose of exer-
cising its corporate franchise within the boundaries of a
state. This question of late years, has been the subject of
much discussion and thinkers have adianced many different
theories to support both the affirmativo and negativc sides of
the quarre. The imyor4 : nce of this question will be seen
at a glance. It is obvious that if a state has this Tower
it may exercise it to the extent of practical exclusion or
may selfishly impose onerous conditions and burdens; and on
the other hand if it is conceoded that a state has not this
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Power, then we must concede that the Constitution in this
particular case makes the laws of one state binding upon an-
other, even although those laws may bo entirely ftposed to
the policy of the latter state. It is well settled that a
state may exclude entirely from its borders; and having the
power of exclusion may restrict, burden or impose any con-
dition it may see fit upon a foreign corporation which is
not engaged in inter-state commerce if admitted within its
territorial limits. On principle the arguements for the
affirmative of this rropositionwhich have been advanced, in
brief are:-- That a foreign corporation is a creature of the
lawsof the state that created it and independent of those
laws car. have no existence, that Lhe laws of ore state are
not binding upon another and therefore if a state affords
recognition to a foreign corporation id does so merely by
reason of inter-state comity; that incorporation is not a
necessary element of an inter-state commerce business and -kf-
that if a state considers corporations contrary to her policy,
it may, in the exercise of the police power declare those ar-
tificial, invisible, intengible persons to be productive of
fraud., repeal its own statutes creating them and exclude for-
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eign corporations from entering, or having the rower to ex-
clude may regulate their action and impose a tax o the -ri-
vilege it grants )if it allows them to do business within
her boundaries. Again the franchise or privilege of doing
business within the state on a limited liability baits, of
having a corporate nameda~ exercising other corporate priv-
ileges, is property. Property having its situs within the
state---for it c3nnot be exercised witholit her borders---and
property having value. Value)which may be assessed andithere-
fore)under all the decisions may be tarred as property having
a situs within the state.
On the other hand, it is argued that a corporation
is a necessary element, instrument and means of carrying on
foreign or inter-state commerce' th ,t a tax upon this means
is a tax upon the business of inte r-state copmmerce, that it
is proscribing the rule by 1 ich corLiwIrce may be carried on
and therefore unconstitutional. Numerous dicta favoring
both of those positions are to be found in the cases but are
so conflicting as to make them unreliable. The question,
however, came ur squarely, for decision in the case of Maine
vs. The Grand Trunk R.R.Co., 142 U.S., 217,. The state of
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Maine had yassed a law irosing a tax upon every corporation,
operating a railroad within the ,tate for tho yrivilege of
exercising its franchise therein, to be determined by the
aamount of - its gross traisportation receiyts and further
providing that whmn a]pplied to a railroad lying partly within
and partly without the state, or to one operated as a part of
a line or system extending beyond the state, the tax shall be
equal to the roportion of the percent'ae of the gross re-
ceipts within the state. '-he Grand Trunk R.R.Co., a foreign
corporation, contended that the statute imposed a regulation
upon inter-state commerce and tas for that reason void but
the court held that the tax was one which the state had power
to levy and was valid. Field J. in rendering the prevail-
ing opinion said "The validity of a tax can in no may be de-
pendent upon the mode which the state may deem fit to adopt
in fixing the arnount for any year which it will exact for
their franchise." The judges who dissented rested their
opinion upon the ground that the tax was in reality a tax upon
the gross receipts and as such void under all the decisions.
Their language does not deny the power, of a state, to tax the
francise of acting as a corporation within the state and,I
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think, may be taken to be decisive of the question. How
the courts will treat this case, however, temains to be seen;
but in the opinion of the writer they will treat it as decis-
ive of the proposition that a state can impose a tax upon the
privilege it -rants to a foreign corporation of acting within
the state, as such,
I have now briefly examined the leading cases
which determine the line of demarcation between the power
of Congress and the power of the state; and from them, I think,
we may draw the following conclusions and well settled prin-
ciples of law.
CONCLUSIONS.
I. Articles brought into a state, fvom a foreign nation
or from another state, remain, while in the original package,
articles of commerce.
II. Persons as well as goods, merchandise etc., may be
the subjects of inter-state commerce.
III. The state can constitutionally irapose a tax upon
all property, personal or real having its situs within the
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boundaries of the state; and this, notwithstanding the fact
that such property nqay be engaged in the business of carry-
ing on inter-state commerco.
IV. A state has not the row er to levy a tax upon the
gross receipts derived from the transportation, of passen-ers
or freight, between one ctate and other states or foreign na-
tions.
V. A state has not the power to levy a tax upon the
business or privilege of ca:rrying on irter-state or foreign
commerce.
VI. A tax upon the instru Mernts or means of carrying
on inter-state commerce is unconatitutional and void, if such
tax is levied upon those instruments or means because they
are eengaged in such commercc.
VII. A telegrayh comryany occupies an analogous position
to a trans-:ortation company, and if its lines extend beyond
the bound.aries of the state its business is that of inter-
state coMMerc'.
vIII. The articles forming the subjects of inter-state
coriercc cannot be taxed by a state as such, even although
the statute imrosing such tax does not discriminate between
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articles manufactured within the state a.d those manufactured
without.
IX. A state may levy a tax or imyose a lice-sc fee upon
a forc. ign cor7oratio,Lr for t-1c rrivileg(, or franchise of acting
as a corporation within the state.
X. The validity of a tax does not derend upon the mode
in which its amount is to be aseertained but upon the sub-
ject matter of the tax. n

